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Abstract
I study the distribution of voting power between di¤erent decision-makers in French
river basin committees over the period 1987-2007. To do so, in the rst part of the
paper, I apply di¤erent power measures traditionally used in the literature as well as
some other ones lesser known in this context. I compare then the predictions of several
indices for the relative power of di¤erent decision-makers in di¤erent voting situations.
In the second part, I describe the methodology to design an optimal decision rule. A
simple computational exercise based on this methodology suggests that the residential
water users in Adour-Garonne river basin were under represented in the river basin
committee during 1989-2006.
Key words: environmental management, water policy, collective decision-making,
voting, power indices, optimal decision rule
1 Introduction
Stakeholder participation in the design of environmental policies becomes more and more
important for e¢ cient decision-making (Goodhue et al., 2008). However, design and im-
plementation of environmental policies in the presence of several stakeholder groups with
conicting interests as well as the state representatives turns into a di¢ cult and challenging
task. In this paper I address this issue in the context of water policy in France.
Toulouse School of Economics (LERNA, INRA), vzaporoz@toulouse.inra.fr, phone: +33 561 63 57 70.
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Water Agencies (WAs) have been important water policy institutions in France since the
middle of 1960s. The general mission of WAs is to protect water against any action which can
deteriorate its quality and quantity. The main focus of current policy is on reaching an ade-
quate ecological state of river basin resources while maintaining a balance between available
water resources and water needs. In practice, it translates into a set of practical objectives
such as reduction of the impact of human activities on aquatic ecosystems, maintaining the
natural processes of aquatic ecosystems, promoting the quantitative management of river
streams, in particular during the summer, managing ground water resources in a sustainable
manner, improving the quality of drinking water, etc. (Adour-Garonne Water Agency, 2012).
The French water policy relies upon the principle of decentralized management of the
water resource by river basin. In each of six French Water Agencies there is a River Basin
Committee (RBC) acting as a water parliament. Consisting of elected members of local
and parliamentary chambers, water usersrepresentatives and the public administration, the
RBCs are in charge of elaborating the environmental objectives of the river basin through
voting on di¤erent issues.
The main focus of this research is the decision-making at the six French RBCs. Speci-
cally, I analyze how the composition of the RBC and the voting rules relate to voting power
of the di¤erent (groups of) decision-makers in di¤erent types of voting situations. The tra-
ditional measures such as Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954) and Banzhaf
index (Penrose, 1946 and Banzhaf, 1965) have been widely discussed and applied to analyze
many voting institutions such as the EU Council of Ministers1, the United States Legislative
system2, the Canadian Constitutional Amendment Scheme3. The Banzhaf index has been
also used to study the design of voting bodies in the EU, US, or IMF4. To the best of my
knowledge, no one has used the concepts of voting power to examine the distribution of
1For example, Laruelle and Widgrén (1998), Napel and Widgrén (2006, 2011), Felsenthal and Machover
(2001), Barr and Pasarrelli (2009) among many others.
2For example, Mann and Shapley (1962), Stra¢ n (1976), Felsenthal and Macover (1998).
3For example, Stra¢ n (1977) among others.
4Including Banzhaf (1968), Felsenthal and Machover (2001, 2004), Grofman and Feld (2005), Fidrmuc et
al. (2009), Leech and Leech (2009), Miller (2009, 2012), Kirsch and Langner (2011) among others.
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power among di¤erent decision-makers in the French RBC.
In this paper I apply di¤erent power measures traditionally used in the literature as well
as some other ones lesser known in this context to analyze the power distribution in two
types of voting situations. The rst type, binary issues, in which a decision-maker can
either vote yesor no, such as the decision on whether to construct a dam. However,
not all the voting situations can be classied as binary, for example, the surplus distribution
between the stakeholders. I consider such distributive issuesas a second type of voting
situations. One of the examples of distributive situations is the funding of local projects
by the RBC through subsidies. The main di¤erence with the binary setting is that in a
distributive setting the set of alternatives is a simplex.
In the context of the RBCs, in the distributive situations mainly three water users
(residential, industrial and agricultural) benet from the surplus distribution, while other
decision-makers also vote on the decision. In contrast, in the binary situations, there are
may be more beneciaries, for instance, the ecologists in the example related to the reser-
voir (non)construction. The later situation is illustrated by the recent protests against the
clearing of the Testet wet zone in the Sivens forest (Tarn region, southwestern France) in
preparation of the Sivens dam construction. The supporters of the dam construction, in-
cluding the FDSEA (Departmental Federation of syndicated farmers), claim that the dam
is in the public interest as it will ensure irrigation and the development of high-value crops.
The opponents of the project, backed by French green party, argue the dam will destroy
biodiversity and will only benet a small number of farmers.
In the binary setting I use the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik indices that are well
adapted for this situation. In the context of the distributive situations, the Shapley-Shubik
index also seems to be an appropriate power measure (for example, Felsenthal and Machover,
1998). It evaluates a voters expected relative share in a xed budget. Apart from the
Shapley-Shubik index, I introduce two other measures of power suitable to analyze distrib-
utive situations. One of them is the nucleolus, which is not very well known in this context.
However, it is becoming more popular as it can be a good alternative to the Shapley-Shubik
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index5. Another power measure applied in my numerical analysis is derived as the vector
of expected equilibrium payo¤s from a well-known legislative bargaining game due to Baron
and Ferejohn (1989). Interestingly, under some conditions it coincides with the nucleolus
(Montero, 2006).
In the second part of the paper, I focus on the distributive situations. I emply the
power measures to investigate an important issue, the design of an optimal decision rule in
RBCs. In fact, the question of nding the optimal voting weights for the representatives of
di¤erent countries has been already addressed in the literature, but mostly under the binary
setting6. Under this assumption there are two approaches in the literature. The rst one
is the utilitarian approach7 that seek to maximize the total utility of all citizens, and the
second one is the egalitarian approach that seek to equalize the power of all citizens measured
by the Banzhaf index. Felsenthal and Machover (1998), adopting the egalitarian approach,
show that the optimal weights are such that each countrys Banzhaf index is proportional
to the square root of its population size (Penroses rule, Penrose, 1946). By comparing the
Bz and the square root of the population, they show that larger member states in the EU
tend to have too little power and the smaller ones too much. Algaba et al. (2007) apply this
theory to analyze the power of the European citizens for 25 and 27 countries. Le Breton,
Montero and Zaporozhets (2012) also follow the egalitarian approach, however under the
distributive setting with the nucleolus as the power measure. Following this direction I
would like to investigate this question for the French RBCs applying three di¤erent power
measures suitable for the distributive setting.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the organization and the functioning of
WAs in France are briey described. Section 3 provides a descriptive analysis of power for
di¤erent groups participating in the decision-making process related to the water policy. In
the rst part I focus on the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik index to analyze the binary
5Recent references include Le Breton et al. (2012), Montero (2005, 2013), Garcia-Valinas and Zaporozhets
(2014).
6Le Breton, Montero and Zaporozhets (2012) is an exception.
7See for example, Barberà and Jackson (2006), Beisbart, Bovens and Hartmann (2005) and Beisbart and
Hartmann (2010).
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setting. As the analysis demonstrates, in general, the two indices give very close predictions.
In the second part I consider distributive situations and compare the performance of the
three power measures adapted to the analysis. Additionally, I characterize the conditions
under which all three of them give the same result. In Section 4 I address the issue of
the optimal design of the RBC. First, I tackle the question whether the three water users
in the French RBCs are fairly represented. Then, I explain and apply a methodology of
choosing the optimal decision rule. In Section 5 I analyze few cases where the Banzhaf and
the Shapley-Shubik indices give signicantly di¤erent results. Following Stra¢ n (1977), I
describe possible modications of the classical indices which might be more applicable in
this situation. Finally, Section 6 provides a summary of the main ndings as well as some
policy implications and possible extensions.
2 French River Basin Committees
The French WAs have been created in 1966, following the rst Water Act of 1964, which
institutionalized a decentralized water management system at the hydro-geographical level
of the river basin. This system has been reinforced by the subsequent Water Acts of 19928
and 20069. The six Water Agencies (Adour-Garonne, Artois-Picardie, Loire-Bretagne, Rhin-
8The Water Act of January 2, 1992 instituted the principle and the tools of integrated water manage-
ment by the RB. The law also translates European directives into French national law. These new tools
are the SDAGE (Schémas Directeurs dAménagement et de Gestion des Eaux) and the SAGE (Schémas
dAménagement et de Gestion des Eaux). The SDAGE are designed by the RBCs, while the SAGE are
designed at the sub-river basin level, in the framework of the Local Water Commission, which includes 50%
elected persons, 25% users and 25% representatives of the State.
9The reform of 2006 was devoted to making the system compliant with the Constitution, by reinforcing
the role of the RBC, while maintaining the control from the State. The goal of the reform was also to
improve operational e¢ ciency and provide enough exibility in the determination of taxes.
In compliance with the article 34 of the Constitution, the law now sets the rules on tax bases and ceilings
for the unit tax rates. The law also provides the main orientations for the multi-year intervention programs,
sets the expected level of agenciesbudget and leaves to the government the task of supervising the objectives
in terms of expenses by major domain of intervention.
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Meuse, Rhône-Méditerranée-Corse and Seine-Normandie) are public establishments of ad-
ministrative nature under the supervision of two ministries: the Ministry of the Environment
and the Ministry of Finance.
WAs participate at each river basin level in the national and the European water policies,
by developing a strategy originating from an overall view of water issues. WAs contribute
to reaching an adequate state of water bodies by reducing the impact of human activities,
by preserving water resources and by satisfying user needs through a balance between water
resources and rational water use.
Often presented as Water Parliaments, RBCs participate in the design and adoption of
the multi-year intervention programs, they determine the major priorities of the intervention
policy of the Agencies, they vote on the tax basis and emission tax rates and the general
conditions for attribution of subsidies to the water related projects10. The Executive Board
rst constructs and then submits a proposal to the RBC for approval. The decisions are
taken by the majority rule, i.e., to pass a proposal requires approval by more than half of
participants. In what follows I assume 100% participation, however some RBCs have explicit
quorum requirement.
Each RBC has three colleges: local elected persons, water users (agriculture, industry,
residential water users) and representatives of the State (administration). Each college elects
among its members the administrators of the WA. The government determines the number
of Basin Committee members, including the representation of each category of users (agri-
culture, tourism, industry, etc.). Representatives of the State from various Ministries as well
as from the State prefectures are also included. For example, in the Adour-Garonne RBC
in 2012 there were 135 members divided into three colleges: the rst college of 54 members
representing the local communities, the second college of 54 members representing users and
professional bodies and the third college of 27 members representing the State and public
10There are several commissions within an RBC, which are delegated by the Executive Board of WA
to work on important projects. For example, the Subsidy Commission makes recommendations on major
subsidies to be granted to the water-related projects, and the Program Commission deliberates on the multi-
year intervention programs.
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boards. The rst college is composed of representatives from the regions, the large munici-
palities and and the small municipalities (with a qualication for the municipalities located
in either mountain areas or seaside areas). The second college has 9 representatives from
agriculture, 27 representatives from the industry and 18 representatives from di¤erent asso-
ciations (consumers, protection of the environment), regional Social and Economic Councils
and groups of experts.
The composition of the RBCs depends on the geographical range of the basin with the
minimum of 58 members in Rhin-Meuse RBC in 1993   1998 and the maximum of 187
members in Seine-Normandie in 2005   2007. The distribution of representatives in the
six RBCs during the period 1987   2007 is provided in the Appendix. One may see that
the proportion of representatives for local communities, regions and districts is signicant,
compared to the representatives of water users. Representatives from the agricultural sector
are typically more numerous in the RBCs characterized by a higher agricultural activity, as
Adour-Garonne and Loire-Bretagne. Representatives of the State have the minority while
the number of local elected persons is greater than 1=3 on average, and representatives of
users and socio-professional groups have the majority. In 1999, members of the RBCs and
Executive Boards of all Agencies have been renewed with a better representation of urban and
rural communities, consumer associations, environmental associations, agriculture and a new
representative for small and medium industries. There are now about 40% of elected members
for local communities, 40% for water user representatives, and 20% for representatives of the
State.
3 Descriptive analysis of power
3.1 Binary Issues: The Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik power
indices.
In this subsection we consider binary yes/nodecisions by the committee. For simplicity,
we assume that the amendments to the proposal are not possible. In this binary setting, a
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priori power of a voter is usually measured by the probability of the voter being pivotal. In
this context, the two classical voting power measures, namely the Banzhaf and the Shapley-
Shubik power indices, are the most used in the literature. I rst, recall the formal denitions,
and then provide the numerical results for the two indices applied to the six French RBCs
in 1987  2007.
In what follows, N denotes a set of the n members of an RBC. We also dene a set of
winning coalitions W: a collection of subsets of N with the following properties:
1) ; =2 W;
2) N 2 W;
3) if S 2 W and T  S then T 2 W (monotonicity).
The interpretation of the setW is the following. If S is a set of members voting in favour
of a particular decision then the decision is accepted if S 2 W and it fails if S =2 W. Sets
that do not belong toW are called loosing coalitions. A pair (N;W) is called a simple game,
and it fully describes an RBC.
The Shapley-Shubik index (SSI) for a simple game (N;W) is dened as follows. The
players vote in a specic order and as the majority is reached the proposal is accepted. The
voter whose participation turns the existing coalition from a loosing into a winning one is
called critical for that ordering. The critical voter is assumed to get the credit for having
passed the bill. The SSI is then determined through the assumption of a random voting
order:
i =
number of orderings in which i is critical
total number of orderings
.
One may notice that
nX
i=1
i = 1, i.e., the vector  = (1; 2; :::; n) is normalized.
For example, let us consider the following game with three voters. Player one has two
votes, players two and three have one vote each, and the decision is passed if the total number
of votes in favour is at least 3. Below we list the six possible orderings in which the players
cast their votes:
123, 132, 213, 231, 312, and 321.
For each ordering, the critical player (the one who turns the set of his predecessors into a
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winning coalition) is underlined.
The Shapley-Shubik index i of player i is the number of times that player i is underlined
divided by six. We obtain:
1 =
4
6
, 2 = 3 =
1
6
.
The Banzhaf index of a simple game (N;W) is introduced in a di¤erent way. One denes
a swing for any player i as a winning coalition S containing i and such that i0s departure
from S would change coalition S from winning to loosing. Let us dene:
0i =
number of swings for i
2n 1
.
Vector 0 = (01; 
0
2; :::; 
0
n) is called absolute Banzhaf power and, in fact, it is not normalized.
The normalized version of this measure, the Banzhaf power index (BZ), is given by:
i =
0i
nX
i=1
0i
.
For the above example with three voters, the set of winning coalitions W consists of
f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f1; 2; 3g. In the rst two coalitions both players are critical, however, in the
third one only player one is critical. Consequently:
01 =
3
4
; 02 = 
0
3 =
1
4
and 1 =
3
5
; 2 = 3 =
1
5
:
In what follows I provide the numerical results for both the BZ and the SSI for the six
French RBC in 1987   200711. The voting situations in RBCs can be represented through
weighted majority games. The game (N;W) is said to be a weighted majority game if there
exists an n-tuple ! = (!1; :::; !n) of non-negative weights with !1 + !2 + :::+ !n = 1 and a
nonnegative quota q such that any S 2 W if and only if the total weight of the players in S
exceeds the quota q, i.e.,
P
i2S !i  q: The pair [q;!] is called a representation of the game
(N;W). In order to run the calculations it is necessary to have information on the number
of the representatives in the committees (provided in the Appendix) and the quota. Given
that the decisions are taken by the majority rule, the quota is calculated as q =
jPn
i=1 qi
2
k
12.
11I use the computer software for the voting power analysis which is available at
http://homepages.warwick.ac.uk/~ecaae/.
12For any real number x, bxc denotes the smallest integer greater than x.
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Remark. It is important to note that operating with the voting weights instead of
the set of winning coalitions may be confusing. The same game (N;W) may admit several
representations. For example, a majority game with three players has the following set of
winning coalitions: f1; 2g ; f1; 3g ; f2; 3g ; f1; 2; 3g. At the same time, it can be equivalently
represented as [2; 1; 1; 1] or [51; 49; 49; 2]. The representation [2; 1; 1; 1] suggests equal voting
weights for the three voters. However, in the representation [51; 49; 49; 2] the voting weight of
the rst voter 24:5 times as much as the voting weight of the third voter. As one may check,
the Bz and the SSI are equal to 1=3 for every voter independently of the representation.
Tables 12-17 in the Appendix provide calculations for the distribution of power among
di¤erent decision-makers in the six RBCs over 1987  2007. The results indicate that the Bz
and the SSI give very close predictions in most cases. Not surprisingly, districts have very
high voting power, around 30%. Industrial users have around 15%. There are also many
small groups with relatively low values of the Bz and the SSI.
In general, the voting power need not be proportional to voting weights13. However, the
tables show that the power indices for the RBCs are relatively proportional to the weights.
Here we deal with a situation where there is a large number of players and none of them is
dominant enough. It seems that for this case Penroses approximation works well (Lindner
and Machover, 2004). It states that voting power tends to become proportional to voting
weights as the number of voters increases, provided that the distribution of voting weights
is not too unequal. In fact, when the players are put into a smaller number of blocks, the
power indices are not proportional to the weights anymore (see discussion in Section 4 and
the table for Adour-Garonne RBC in the Appendix).
There are some intuitive properties that the Bz and the SSI satisfy. For example, both
indices respect monotonicity: whenever representative i has more votes than representative
j, then the voting power of i is higher than the power of j. However, the relation of voting
13A striking example is the EU Council of Ministers in 1958 - 1972. During that time it consisted of the
representatives of 6 countries: Germany, Italy and France held 4 votes each, Belgium and Netherlands held
2 votes each and Luxembourg held 1 vote. In order to pass a proposal it was necessary to have at least 12
out of 17 votes in favour. Since other member states held an even number of votes, Luxembourg formally
was never able to make any di¤erence in the voting process.
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weights with the power is not so straightforward. One may think that it is possible to
decrease a voters voting weight within a voting body and at the same time increase his/her
power. It is called the paradox of redistribution. The idea is that there is a voter donating
some weight to another one, so donor looses weight and recipient gains some while the total
weight stays the same. The paradox of redistribution states that a donor can gain power or
a recipient can loose power. This is the case for industry in Adour-Garonne RBC: in the
period 1993  1998 it had 12 votes which is the same as in the period 1999  2004. However,
the total number of votes has increased from 81 to 98, implying that the relative number of
votes for the industry has dropped. However, the Bz shows an increase in power from 0:136
to 0:159 as well as the SSI indicates an increase from 0:182 to 0:186.
3.2 Distributive Issues
The analysis of distributive issues in RBCs such as taxes and subsidies has some specicities.
There are only three groups, namely residential water users, industrial water users and the
farmers contributing to the budget by paying di¤erent taxes and they may benet from the
redistribution by receiving subsidies to nance di¤erent projects. However, everybody in the
committee including representatives of the administration participate in the decision-making
process. The representatives of water users in the committee are assumed to be selsh, i.e.,
driven exclusively by their own shares in the proposal. In contrast, the preferences of the
other committee members can possibly aggregate the welfare of the 3 categories of users.
Here, I impose a simplifying assumption that each representative of the administration
acts on behalf of a single group of users. Formally, the water users are indexed by j = 1; 2; 3
and the representatives of the administration - by k = 4; : : : ; n. Let us denote by !j the
voting weight (number of representatives) of sector j for all j = 1; :::; 3. All other voters
have a weight equal to 1. We denote by Mj (respectively by mj) the group (respectively the
number) of representatives in the set f4; :::; ng acting on behalf of user j. We have:
3X
j=1
mj = n  3:
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The group of voters voting on behalf of the group j = 1::3 has a weight equal to:
qj = !j +mj: (1)
We have obtained a new weighted majority game with three players [q; q1; q2; q3], where
the quota q is the same as before. In fact, for three groups there are very few possible games.
Following Le Breton, Montero and Zaporozhets (2012), I consider ve possible games14,
which can be described as weighted majority games. These are [1; 1; 0; 0] in which player 1
is a dictator, [3; 2; 1; 1] in which player 1 is a veto player15 but not a dictator, [2; 1; 1; 0] in
which players 1 and 2 are veto players, [3; 1; 1; 1] in which all three players are veto players,
and [2; 1; 1; 1] which is the simple majority game with no veto players.
Example: Adour-Garonne RBC, 1987-2007.
In this example I would like to group the decision-makers in Adour-Garonne RBC into
three groups by attributing the votes of state representatives and other non-users to the
three water user groups. To do so in a rigorous way, one would need the data on actual
votes in the committee which are not available. Instead, I assume that the representatives
of the rural communities, the ministries of agriculture, land development and rural a¤airs
vote in line with the farmers. The representatives of the associations of residential water
users, environmental organizations, shery, water suppliers, tourism, ministry of health,
environment and interior cast their votes on behalf of the residential water users. The
representatives of the ministry of industry have their votes in line with the industrial users.
Other RBC members who are not water users split their votes equally between the three
groups. As the result, we get the following distribution of seats between the three user
groups.
14The game is assumed to be monotonic (adding players cannot turn a winning coalition into a losing one),
proper (no two disjoint coalitions can be winning), directed (players can be unambiguously ranked in order
of desirability with player 1 being at least as desirable as player 2, who is at least as desirable as player 3),
N 2 W and ; =2 W.
15A player that belongs to all minimal winning coalitions is called a veto player.
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Table 1 Distribution of representatives in Adour - Garonne RBC, 1987 - 2007.
1987  1992 1993  1998 1999  2004 2005  2007
Agriculture 22:67 21:33 25:67 24
Industry&energy 27:67 27:33 28:67 29
Residential 33:67 32:33 43:67 44
Total 84 81 98 97
Quota 43 41 50 49
One may check that for all four periods such distribution of seats and the quota corre-
spond to the simple majority game [2; 1; 1; 1].
The most famous power measure applied in the distributive situations is the SSI16. Thus,
Felsenthal and Machover (1998) argue that the SSI is a measure of P-power: it evaluates
a voters expected relative share of a xed budget, which a winning coalition can obtain.
In addition, we apply two alternative power measures, which can be derived as vectors of
equilibrium payo¤s of positive models of politics.
3.2.1 The Nucleolus
The nucleolus is a solution concept for cooperative games, which was rst formulated by
Shmeidler (1969). As it is argued in Montero (2006), Le Breton et al. (2012) and Garcia-
Valinas and Zaporozhets (2014), the nucleolus is a suitable measure to analyze bargaining
over a xed budget and it can be a good alternative to the SSI. Mashler, Peleg and Shap-
ley (1979) provide the following intuitive meaning of the nucleolus. Suppose there is an
arbitrator, who helps the players to decide on the allocation of the common budget. The
arbitrator may take the excess of a coalition (the gain/loss that the members of the coalition
have if they depart from it) as a measure of dissatisfaction and he may try to decrease it.
The coalitions with the negative excess do not want to defect, and the higher the excess
of the coalition is, the higher is the coalition dissatisfaction. So, the arbitrator will look
16For the denitions and the properties see, for example, Felsenthal and Machover (1998) and Laruelle
and Valenciano (2008).
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for the payo¤s in which the highest excess is as low as possible. If there are several such
payo¤s, he will proceed in recursive manner: he chooses the outcomes for which the second
highest excess is minimal and so on. The formal denition of the nucleolus is provided in
the Appendix.
3.2.2 Bargaining and Power
In this section, we describe the power of the players as the expected equilibrium payo¤s from
a popular legislative bargaining game introduced by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) adapted
for our specic setting. As was pointed out before, the main specicity here is that all
the decision-makers in RBC participate in the decision on the distribution of the surplus,
however, only three water user groups benet from the nal distribution.
The bargaining proceeds as follows. At every round t = 1; 2,... Nature selects a random
proposer: player i is selected with probability pi with i = 1; ::; n. This player proposes a
distribution of the budget (x1; x2; x3) with xj  0 for all j = 1; 2; 3 and
P3
j=1 xi = 1. Due
to our assumption on the behavior of the representatives from the administration, one may
say that the probability of player j = 1; 2; 3 of being selected as a proposer is equal tobpj = pj +Pk2Mj pk. The proposal is voted upon immediately according to the voting rule
represented by a voting game [q; q1; q2; q3] derived above. If the coalition of voters in favor
of the proposal is winning, the proposal is implemented and the game ends; otherwise the
game proceeds to the next period in which Nature selects a new proposer. Players are risk
neutral and discount future payo¤s by a factor i 2 [0; 1). A (pure) strategy for player i is
a sequence i = (ti)
1
t=1, where 
t
i; the tth round strategy of player i, prescribes:
1. A proposal x.
2. A response function assigning yes or no to all possible proposals by the other
players.
The solution concept is stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE). Stationarity re-
quires that players follow the same strategy at every round t regardless of past o¤ers and
responses to past o¤ers. Banks and Duggan (2000) have shown that an SSPE always exists17
17The existence result is provided by Banks and Duggan (2000) in a very general setting in which the space
14
in this type of bargaining model. In addition, Eraslan (2002) and Eraslan and McLennan
(2013) have shown that all SSPE lead to the same expected equilibrium payo¤s.
In the case where i ! 1 for all i = 1; :::; n, we denote by BF(N;W) the unique vector of
equilibrium payo¤s attached to the SSPE of the bargaining game18. Hereafter, we refer to
this vector as the Baron-Ferejohn measure of power attached to the simple game (N;W).
Montero (2006) has analyzed the above bargaining game in the case where i =  < 1
for all i = 1; :::; n. She shows that if the vector p coincides with the nucleolus, then p is the
unique vector of equilibrium payo¤s. In her terminology, the nucleolus is a self-conrming
measure of power.
Table 2 presents the values for the SSI, the nucleolus and the BF for the case of equal
recognition probabilities, i.e., pj = 1=3 for j = 1:::3. Interestingly, the Nucl and the BF give
the same predictions for all 5 games. One may notice that in the presence of veto players
the two indices, the Nucl and the BF, attribute all power to the veto players and leave the
other players with no power. Moreover, the power is equally shared between the veto players
if there are several of them. The Nucl and the BF disagree with the SSI only in the case of
the veto game [3; 2; 1; 1].
of outcomes can be any convex compact set and the utility functions are concave but otherwise unrestricted.
18The BF in the case of pi = 1=n for all i = 1:::n is applied to study the distribution of power among
di¤erent countries in the EU Council of Ministers in Montero (2007) and Le Breton et al. (2012).
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Table 2 Power Values for 5 possible games with 3 groups.
SSI Nucl BF
[1; 1; 0; 0]
dictatorial
(1; 0; 0) (1; 0; 0) (1; 0; 0)
[3; 2; 1; 1]
veto
 
2
3
; 1
6
; 1
6

(1; 0; 0) (1; 0; 0)
[2; 1; 1; 0]
veto 12
 
1
2
; 1
2
; 0
  
1
2
; 1
2
; 0
  
1
2
; 1
2
; 0

[3; 1; 1; 1]
unanimity
 
1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
  
1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
  
1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3

[2; 1; 1; 1]
majority
 
1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
  
1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3
  
1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3

One may notice that the example for Adour-Garonne RBC corresponds to the last row
in the table, i.e., the three indices suggest equal distribution of power for the three water
user groups.
I would like to characterize the set of possible weights q1; q2; q3 for which the three indices
disagree. First, the sets Mi are not known exactly , however, due to the equality (1) the
following inequalities should be satised:
qi  !i for i = 1:::3.
The total number of representatives should stay the same:
q1 + q2 + q3 =
nX
i=1
qi.
The disagreement appears in the situation with one vetoer. Suppose, it is player 1. Then,
we get additional set of inequalities:
q1 + q2  q
q1 + q3  q
q2 + q3 < q:
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Similar inequalities hold if player 2 or 3 is a vetoer. In the picture below the set of possible
weights for which the three indices give di¤erent results is drawn.
[Figure is about here]
4 The optimal institutional design
In the previous section we have calculated the power of each representative in the RBC
measured by di¤erent power measures both for binary and the distributive settings. In this
section we would like to address an important issue of the optimal voting rule applying these
power measures.
Fairness suggests to allocate the gains equally across all water users. This means that
each water user group in the RBC should receive a share proportional to its population size.
If there were no intermediate voting bodies, i.e., if the simple game was the majority game
with the set of the water users as the set of voters, then all the coordinates of the power index
would be equal and proportionality would be fullled. Unfortunately, we are in a second
best situation: the negotiation takes place across the representatives and the share obtained
by the representatives in the RBC is divided among the corresponding water users. We need
to evaluate the usersindirect power via their representatives.
Le Breton, Montero and Zaporozhets (2012) have examined this question for the EU
citizens under the distributive setting with the Nucl as the power measure. In this section I
extend their analysis by applying three power indices appropriate for this situation: the SSI,
the Nucl and the BF in the context of RBCs. In what follows power indexmeans one of the
three power indices if it is not indicated otherwise, and we denote it by  = (1; 2; 3). The
three components of vector  correspond to the shares of the three water users (agricultural,
industrial and residential).
The optimization variable here is the simple game (M;W)19, where M = f1; 2; 3g is the
set of water usersgroups, and W is the set of the winning coalitions. We assume that each
group of representatives in the RBC receives a share of the budget equal to the power index
19See also Remark 1.
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of the simple voting game. Then, each groups payo¤ is divided equally among corresponding
water users.
If we would like to equalize the userspower, we need to choose a voting rule which leads
to the power index for the representatives being equal to the water userspopulation sizes.
However, except some very specic cases, it is not possible to nd a game for which the
vector of userspopulation sizes coincides with the power index. We will try to nd simple
games whose power index is as close as possible to the population shares.
We would like to design the simple game (M;W) in such a way that the distance between
the induced power index calculated at the water user level and the rst best is the smallest
possible. Following Le Breton, Montero and Zaporozhets (2012) we consider the quadratic
distance. Let us denote by ni the population size of group i = 1; 2; 3 and n = n1 + n2 + n3
is the total population in the river basin. Denoting by S the set of all simple games with 3
players, our problem is dened as follows:
min
(M;W)2S
var ((M;W)) ;
and
var ((M;W)) =
3X
i=1
ni

1
n
  i
ni
2
: (2)
The term i
ni
indicates how much power (according to any of the three power indices) a
water user in group i gets given a specic voting rule. The expression (2) can be simplied
into:
var ((M;W)) =
3X
i=1
(i)
2
ni
  1
n
: (3)
The general problem, known as an inverse problem, is to characterize which vectors can
be obtained as a power vector for an adequate choice of a simple game, has been formulated
recently by Alon and Edelman (2010) for the Bz. They analyze power distributions with
most of the power concentrated on the small number of voters. They provide explicit bounds
stating that a Bz vector with weights concentrated on k < n players has to be near the Bz
vector of a game with n k dummy players (which is equivalent to the game with k players).
Kurz (2014) tightens this bound and obtains similar bounds for several other power indices
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introduced in the literature. To the best of my knowledge, there are no general results on
the inverse problem for the Nucl, the SSI or BF.
Following Le Breton, Montero and Zaporozhets (2012), I illustrate the procedure for
solving the problem in the case of 3 voters:
1. Following Subsection 3.2 consider 5 possible games in a given class;
2. Calculate the power index  for each game in the list and nd the variance using (3);
3. Choose the game with the minimal variance.
Hereafter we are going to express variance in terms of population shares, i =
ni
n
; i =
1; 2; 3. Without loss of generality, we assume that 1  2  3. We denote by:
V1 =
1
1
  1;
V2 =
1
4

1
1
+
1
2

  1;
V3 =
1
9

1
1
+
1
2
+
1
3

  1;
V4 =
1
36

16
1
+
1
2
+
1
3

  1:
The results for three power indices are presented in the Table 3 below.
Table 3 Variances for 5 possible games with 3 groups.
SSI Nucl and BF
[1; 1; 0; 0] V1
n
V1
n
[3; 2; 1; 1] V4
n
V1
n
[2; 1; 1; 0] V2
n
V2
n
[3; 1; 1; 1] V3
n
V3
n
[2; 1; 1; 1] V3
n
V3
n
On the following gure we show the values of the two biggest groupspopulation shares,
1 and 2, for which each of the ve games is optimal under the SSI, the Nucl and the BF.
One may notice that the majority ([2; 1; 1; 1]) and the unanimity ([3; 1; 1; 1]) rules can
not be distinguished under the three power indices. Not surprisingly, the majority rule is
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Figure 1 The optimal rule for three voters under the SSI, the Nucl and the BF.
optimal when the three groups are not too di¤erent in terms of their population shares. On
the contrary, the dictatorial rule ([1; 1; 0; 0]) is optimal in the case where there is a relatively
big group. Under the SSI there are four di¤erent regions, while under the Nucl and the BF
there are only three ones. The Nucl and the BF cannot distinguish between veto ([3; 2; 1; 1]),
dictatorial and unanimity rules. Under the SSI veto rule is distinguished from other rules.
The following example demonstrates the use of the technique.
Example: Adour-Garonne RBC, 1987-2007 (revisited).
From the calculations in the previous section we conclude that under the assumptions
made the decision rule operating in Adour-Garonne RBC is the simple majority rule. It
implies that the three groups have equal voting power according to the SSI, the Nucl and
the BF. Hereafter, we are going to check whether this rule is optimal, i.e., whether the three
water user groups are fairly represented in the committee. In order to do so, we should check
whether the sizes of the three water users groups in Adour-Garonne river basins are equal.
In what follows, the data on the employment in industry and agriculture as well as the
total employment in the Adour-Garonne river basin in 1989  2006 is used as proxy for the
number of di¤erent water users. In the rst scenario the number of industrial and agricultural
water users is approximated by the number of employed people in industry and agriculture
respectively. The number of residential water users is approximated by the di¤erence between
the total employment and the number of people employed in both industry and agriculture.
One di¢ culty with this assumption is that people working in industry and agriculture are
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also residential water users. Therefore, in the second scenario, the number of industrial
and agricultural water users is approximated by half of the number of employed people in
industry and agriculture respectively. The number of residential users is calculated as the
di¤erence between the total employment and half of people employed both in industry and
agriculture. Of course, one may argue, that a more precise measure should also take into
account the number of unemployed and retired people. I will explain below how to proceed
in this situation.
Table 18 in the Appendix presents the population shares for the three water user groups
in Adour-Garonne river basin in 1989 2006 under two alternative assumptions. It indicates
that the shares for industrial and agricultural users were declining over time whereas the
share for residential users was increasing. Under both scenarios the share for residential
water users is always the biggest and the share for agriculture is the smallest. Moreover,
under the second scenario, the gap in shares between the residential water users and the
two other groups increases. Thus, the shares for the three groups are far from being equal,
therefore we may conclude that under our specic assumptions, the residential water users
are under represented and the two other groups are over represented.
Following the procedure described above we are going to identify the optimal decision
rule for both scenarios. To do so, we calculate variances according to the formulas from
Table 3. In our case 1,2 or 3 corresponds to the populational shares for the residential,
industrial or agricultural users respectively. As we have seen, the assumption 1  2  3
is satised.
In Table 4 below the four variances are calculated for each scenario.
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Table 4 Values of variance calculated for Adour - Garonne river basin, 1989 -
2006.
rst scenario second scenario
V1 V2 V3 V4 V1 V2 V3 V4
1989 0:394 0:767 0:829 0:038 0:165 2:128 2:477 0:355
1990 0:385 0:771 0:869 0:044 0:162 2:140 2:559 0:374
1991 0:371 0:803 0:919 0:051 0:156 2:210 2:661 0:397
1992 0:359 0:838 0:959 0:056 0:152 2:286 2:744 0:416
1993 0:343 0:883 1:024 0:065 0:146 2:382 2:877 0:447
1994 0:331 0:911 1:081 0:075 0:142 2:443 2:993 0:474
1995 0:323 0:916 1:136 0:085 0:139 2:456 3:104 0:501
1996 0:318 0:932 1:165 0:090 0:137 2:489 3:164 0:515
1997 0:308 0:976 1:207 0:097 0:133 2:581 3:250 0:535
1998 0:299 0:991 1:274 0:110 0:130 2:615 3:385 0:567
1999 0:288 1:013 1:360 0:127 0:126 2:663 3:559 0:609
2000 0:287 0:988 1:407 0:138 0:125 2:615 3:654 0:632
2001 0:281 0:997 1:470 0:151 0:123 2:634 3:780 0:663
2002 0:272 1:041 1:530 0:162 0:120 2:726 3:902 0:692
2003 0:265 1:078 1:575 0:171 0:117 2:803 3:993 0:714
2004 0:260 1:111 1:600 0:175 0:115 2:872 4:043 0:725
2005 0:246 1:162 1:738 0:204 0:110 2:978 4:323 0:793
2006 0:237 1:199 1:845 0:227 0:106 3:055 4:538 0:845
Under the rst scenario the SSI suggests that the veto rule [3; 2; 1; 1] is optimal. The Nucl
and the BF cannot distinguish between the two rules, veto rule [3; 2; 1; 1] and the dictatorial
rule [1; 1; 0; 0]. Under the second scenario the three power indices agree that the dictatorial
rule is optimal. In any case, the power indices suggest to reinforce the representation of the
residential water users.
If we add the number of unemployed and retired people to the residential water user
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group, the gap in shares becomes even bigger than in the second scenario as compared to
the rst one. Therefore, we would expect the dictatorial rule to be optimal in such a case.
In what follows I do the same exercise but take the value added produced by each of the
three groups instead of taking groupspopulation sizes.
Table 5 Values of variance calculated for Adour - Garonne river basin, 1989 -
2006.
V1 V2 V3 V4
1990 0:332 0:829 1:164 0:096
1991 0:314 0:845 1:321 0:128
1992 0:309 0:864 1:347 0:132
1993 0:287 0:945 1:478 0:156
1994 0:290 0:990 1:367 0:129
1995 0:307 0:907 1:296 0:119
1996 0:293 0:956 1:383 0:134
1997 0:299 0:983 1:285 0:112
1998 0:296 0:940 1:374 0:133
1999 0:283 0:986 1:465 0:151
2000 0:265 0:990 1:735 0:211
2001 0:278 0:927 1:646 0:194
2002 0:263 0:964 1:838 0:236
2003 0:237 1:068 2:169 0:308
2004 0:230 1:143 2:133 0:296
2005 0:223 1:125 2:425 0:366
2006 0:214 1:184 2:552 0:394
2007 0:212 1:240 2:429 0:362
As before, the Nucl an the BF suggest the two rules, veto rule [3; 2; 1; 1] and the dictatorial
rule [1; 1; 0; 0]. According to the SSI the veto rule [3; 2; 1; 1] should be optimal before 2003,
and the dictatorial rule - between 2003 and 2007.
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5 Extensions
In this section I discuss possible modications of the Bz and the SSI which might be more
adapted to particular situations than either classical index. Stra¢ n (1977) has proved that
the two indices can be derived from the same basic probabilistic model under di¤erent
assumptions about voting behavior. The Bz is obtained under the assumption that the voters
vote completely independently (independence assumption). In contrast, the SSI is obtained
under the assumption that the voters have some common standards or values (homogeneity
assumption).
Formally, let us denote by p = (p1; :::; pn), the vector with the components pi 2 [0; 1] being
the probability that player i votes yeson the given proposal. For di¤erent proposals, the
components pi are selected from some probability distribution on [0; 1]. The Independence
Assumption states that the pis are selected independently from the uniform distribution on
[0; 1]. This assumption implies that each player will vote in favor of any decision with the
probability 1=2. The Homogeneity Assumption states that a number p is selected from the
uniform distribution on [0; 1], and pi = p for all i. Stra¢ n (1977) proves that the answer to
the question What is the probability that the bill supported by player i pass?is given by
absolute Banzhaf measure 0i under the independence assumption, and it is given by the SSI
under the homogeneity assumption.
One may argue that the assumption of the uniform distribution is restrictive. Thus,
Le Breton, Lepelley and Smaoui (2014) propose to introduce a general probability density
function f dened on the interval [0; 1]. Then, the modied homogeneity assumption states
that a number p is drawn according to the distribution f on [0; 1], and pi = p for all i. In
the case of beta distribution:
f(p) =
 (2)
( ())2
p(1  p);
where parameter  > 0 and   is gamma function. The case  = 1 represents the uniform
distribution. One may calculate:
Pr(xi = 1 and xj = 1) =
1Z
0
p2f(p)dp =
1
4
+
1
4(2 + 1)
:
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Then the covariance is calculated as:
cov(xi; xj) =
1
4(2 + 1)
,
and the correlation coe¢ cient between the votes of two voters is given by:
 =
1
2 + 1
.
When ! 0 one gets ! 1 (perfect positive correlation) and when !1 one gets ! 0
(independence).
When  = 1 we get the block model (Felsenthal and Machover, 1998), in which some
representatives always vote in the same way (form blocks). Below, I show an example of gath-
ering di¤erent representatives into blocks according to the similarity of their preferences20.
As a result, there are 11 groups:
1. Farmers (including representatives of the Ministries of Agriculture, Land Development
and Rural A¤airs);
2. Industry (including energy);
3. Urban communities (residential water users);
4. Rural communities;
5. Environmental associations (including shery, water suppliers, tourism, Ministries of
Health, Environment, the Interior, associations of residential water users);
6. Other communities ;
7. Districts and regions ;
8. Ministry of Industry ;
9. Professional bodies;
10. Other ministries;
11. State prefectures.
The rst three categories correspond to water users (those paying emission and water
use taxes, and receiving subsidies from the WA), while other categories are special-interest
20For a more accurate analysis it is neccessary to have data on the actual votes of the di¤erent represen-
tatives in the six RBCs, which is not available.
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groups, ministries and administration. As one may notice, group 4, the rural communities,
is separated from the residential water users, since often these people are also farmers. Their
votes can be in line with the votes of farmers or of the residential water users depending
on the situation. The numerical results for the Adour-Garonne RBC are provided in the
Appendix.
One may think that when assigning some representatives in the same block, their total
power should be at least as great as the sum of the power assigned to these representatives
in the original setting before formation of the block. It seems also natural to expect that
if some voters form a block, this should not increase the relative power of any rival voter.
While it may seem intuitive, in general this property does not hold. It is called the paradox
of large size or superadditivity property21.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I apply di¤erent power measures to analyze the distribution of power for
di¤erent decision-makers in the six French RBCs over the period 1987-2007. In order to
analyze binary voting situations I apply traditional power indices such as the Bz and the
SSI. One of the main messages of this analysis is that the relation between the relative
number of votes and the voting power is not straightforward. While the higher number of
votes implies the higher power the relation is not linear. In general one should be careful
operating with the weights instead of the power measures, as doubling the votes, for example,
does not necessarily lead to the doubling the voting power. Additionally, as the analysis of
the Section 5 demonstrates, when some decision-makers act as a block one should be careful
calculating the voting power of the block as it is not necessarily a sum of the individual
powers.
I also show how to proceed with the analysis of the distributive voting situations such as
funding local projects through subsidies. I apply the SSI which is well known in this context
as well as two other power measures, the nucleolus and the Baron-Ferejohnmeasure, which
21See Felthenthal and Machover (1998) for the details.
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are less known but suitable in this context. The main conclusion of this exercise is that very
often these indices give the same predictions.
There are some insights on the optimal design of an RBC presented in the Section 4. It is
important issue since all water users should be equally represented in the RBCs. I provide a
descriptive analysis as well as a simple computation exercise for Adour-Garonne river basin
which demonstrate the use of the technique. The main conclusion of the exercise is that up
to now the residential water users were under represented. Of course, more rigorous analysis
is necessary to make assumptions on the voting behavior of the RBC members.
In what follows I would like to explore directions for extending the current research.
The power indices applied in this paper are based on a set of assumptions concerning the
functioning of the RBCs and the preferences of their members. When considering the dis-
tributive voting situations we have assumed that the representatives of the administration
act on behalf of a particular water usersgroup. It is not straightforward to collect direct
evidence supporting that assumption. A careful examination of the proceedings reproducing
the synthesis of the debates within the committee is a rst step in that direction. The same
remark is valid for the block models.
In this paper we have considered the conict between the di¤erent decision-makers. While
there is a clear evidence supporting such assumption, we could have instead privileged the
geographic dimension of the conict. Indeed, each WA is in charge of the various sub-
river basins within the broad hydrographic river basin, with local delegations for each. For
example, the Adour-Garonne WA has ve such delegations with permanent sta¤ dedicated
to local water management issues. Instead of having a dispute among users, we could analyze
a dispute among territories. In fact, the balanced composition of the committee in terms of
geographic areas may suggest that this characteristic is important. Nevertheless, we would
have also to make some assumptions on the preferences of those who are not a¢ liated to a
specic area as the members of the third college. We do not know if there are (as we observe
for users) cross subsidies across the territories.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Distribution of representatives in six RBCs
Table 6 Distribution of Representatives in Adour - Garonne RBC, 1987 - 2007.
1987  1992 1993  1998 1999  2004 2005  2007
Agriculture 5 5 7 7
Industry&energy 12 12 12 13
Urban communities 1 1 2 2
Rural communities 1 1 1 1
Coastal communities 0 0 0 0
Other communities 4 4 8 8
Region 6 6 5 6
District 18 18 18 18
Inter-district 0 0 2 3
Fishery & sh industry 3 3 4 4
Tourism 2 2 2 2
Water supply 3 3 2 2
Residential water users 1 1 3 4
Ecologists 2 2 4 4
Professional bodies 8 8 9 8
Ministry of Environment 1 1 1 1
Ministry of land devt&rural a¤ 1 1 1 1
Ministry of health 1 1 1 1
Ministry of the Interior 1 0 1 1
Ministry of Industry 1 1 1 1
Ministry of agri 1 0 1 0
Other ministries 6 5 7 4
State prefectures 6 6 6 6
Total 84 81 98 97
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Table 7 Distribution of Representatives in Artois - Picardie RBC, 1987 - 2007.
1987  1992 1993  1998 1999  2004 2005  2007
Agriculture 3 3 4 4
Industry&energy 12 12 13 12
Urban communities 1 1 2 2
Rural communities 1 1 1 1
Coastal communities 0 0 0 0
Other communities 3 3 5 5
Region 3 3 3 3
District 17 17 17 17
Inter-district 1 1 1 1
Fishery & sh industry 3 3 2 3
Tourism 1 1 1 1
Water supply 1 2 1 1
Residential water users 2 2 1 2
Ecologists 2 2 3 3
Professional bodies 4 4 5 5
Ministry of Environment 1 1 1 1
Ministry of land devt&rural a¤ 1 1 1 1
Ministry of health 1 1 1 1
Ministry of the Interior 1 0 1 1
Ministry of Industry 1 1 1 1
Ministry of agri 1 0 1 1
Other ministries 6 5 7 7
State prefectures 2 2 1 2
Total 68 66 73 75
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Table 8 Distribution of Representatives in Loire - Bretagne RBC, 1987 - 2007.
1987  1992 1993  1998 1999  2004 2005  2007
Agriculture 7 7 8 7
Industry&energy 17 17 18 18
Urban communities 2 2 2 4
Rural communities 1 1 1 1
Coastal communities 0 0 0 0
Other communities 3 1 7 7
Region 8 8 8 8
District 28 28 28 28
Inter-district 0 2 3 2
Fishery & sh industry 5 5 6 6
Tourism 2 2 3 3
Water supply 2 2 2 1
Residential water users 2 2 4 4
Ecologists 3 3 5 5
Professional bodies 12 11 11 12
Ministry of Environment 1 1 1 1
Ministry of land devt&rural a¤ 1 1 1 1
Ministry of health 1 1 1 1
Ministry of the Interior 1 0 1 1
Ministry of Industry 1 1 1 1
Ministry of agri 1 0 1 1
Other ministries 6 5 7 5
State prefectures 10 10 10 9
Total 114 110 129 126
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Table 9 Distribution of Representatives in Rhin-Meuse RBC, 1987 - 2007.
1987  1992 1993  1998 1999  2004 2005  2007
Agriculture 1 1 2 2
Industry&energy 11 11 12 12
Urban communities 2 1 2 3
Rural communities 1 1 1 1
Coastal communities 0 0 0 0
Other communities 2 2 3 3
Region 3 3 3 3
District 14 14 15 15
Inter-district 0 1 1 4
Fishery & sh industry 3 3 3 3
Tourism 1 1 1 1
Water supply 1 1 1 1
Residential water users 1 1 2 2
Ecologists 2 2 3 3
Professional bodies 5 5 5 5
Ministry of Environment 1 1 1 1
Ministry of land devt&rural a¤ 1 1 1 1
Ministry of health 1 1 1 1
Ministry of the Interior 1 0 1 1
Ministry of Industry 1 1 1 1
Ministry of agri 1 0 1 1
Other ministries 5 4 6 4
State prefectures 3 3 3 3
Total 61 58 69 71
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Table 10 Distribution of Representatives in Rhône - Méditerranée - Corse RBC,
1987 - 2007.
1987  1992 1993  1998 1999  2004 2005  2007
Agriculture 5 5 6 6
Industry 18 18 19 19
Urban communities 2 1 4 4
Rural communities 1 1 1 1
Coastal communities 0 0 0 0
Other communities 3 3 8 11
Region 5 6 6 5
District 28 28 28 26
Inter-district 0 1 1 1
Fishery 5 5 6 6
Tourism 3 3 3 3
Water supply 1 3 3 3
Residential water users 1 1 4 4
Ecologists 3 3 5 5
Professional bodies 8 8 8 8
Ministry of Environment 1 1 1 1
Ministry of land devt 1 1 1 1
Ministry of health 1 1 1 1
Ministry of the Interior 1 0 1 1
Ministry of Industry 1 1 1 1
Ministry of agri 1 0 1 1
Other ministries 7 6 8 6
State prefectures 8 8 8 7
Total 104 104 124 121
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Table 11 Distribution of Representatives in Seine-Normandie RBC, 1987 - 2007.
1987  1992 1993  1998 1999  2004 2005  2007
Agriculture 4 4 5 7
Industry&energy 17 17 18 27
Urban communities 1 1 4 12
Rural communities 2 1 1 3
Coastal communities 0 0 0 2
Other communities 3 3 7 21
Region 7 7 7 7
District 25 25 25 25
Inter-district 0 1 1 4
Fishery & sh industry 5 5 5 8
Tourism 2 2 2 3
Water supply 2 2 2 3
Residential water users 2 2 4 6
Ecologists 3 3 6 9
Professional bodies 10 10 10 11
Ministry of Environment 1 1 1 7
Ministry of land devt&rural a¤ 1 1 1 1
Ministry of health 1 1 1 2
Ministry of the Interior 1 1 1 2
Ministry of Industry 1 1 1 2
Ministry of agri 1 0 1 2
Other ministries 6 5 7 15
State prefectures 8 8 8 8
Total 103 101 118 187
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8.2 Power Values for six RBCs
Table 12 Power Values for Adour - Garonne RBC, 1987 - 2007.
1987  1992 1993  1998 1999  2004 2005  2007
qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI
Agriculture 0:060 0:057 0:056 0:062 0:059 0:058 0:071 0:069 0:069 0:072 0:070 0:070
Industry&energy 0:143 0:135 0:146 0:148 0:139 0:151 0:122 0:121 0:126 0:134 0:133 0:140
Urban communities 0:012 0:011 0:011 0:012 0:012 0:011 0:020 0:019 0:019 0:021 0:020 0:019
Rural communities 0:012 0:011 0:011 0:012 0:012 0:011 0:010 0:010 0:009 0:010 0:010 0:009
Coastal communities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other communities 0:048 0:045 0:045 0:049 0:047 0:046 0:082 0:079 0:080 0:082 0:080 0:080
Region 0:071 0:068 0:068 0:074 0:071 0:070 0:051 0:049 0:049 0:062 0:060 0:059
District 0:214 0:253 0:248 0:222 0:262 0:258 0:184 0:210 0:210 0:186 0:211 0:212
Inter-district 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:020 0:019 0:019 0:031 0:030 0:029
Fishery & sh industry 0:036 0:034 0:033 0:037 0:035 0:034 0:041 0:039 0:039 0:041 0:040 0:039
Tourism 0:024 0:022 0:022 0:025 0:023 0:022 0:020 0:019 0:019 0:021 0:020 0:019
Water supply industry 0:036 0:034 0:033 0:037 0:035 0:034 0:020 0:019 0:019 0:021 0:020 0:019
Residential water users 0:012 0:011 0:011 0:012 0:012 0:012 0:031 0:029 0:029 0:041 0:040 0:039
Ecologists 0:024 0:022 0:022 0:025 0:023 0:022 0:041 0:039 0:039 0:041 0:040 0:039
Professional bodies 0:095 0:093 0:093 0:099 0:096 0:110 0:092 0:090 0:091 0:082 0:080 0:081
Ministry of Environment 0:012 0:011 0:011 0:012 0:012 0:011 0:010 0:010 0:009 0:010 0:010 0:009
Ministry of land devt&rural a¤ 0:012 0:011 0:011 0:012 0:012 0:011 0:010 0:010 0:009 0:010 0:010 0:009
Ministry of health 0:012 0:011 0:011 0:012 0:012 0:011 0:010 0:010 0:009 0:010 0:010 0:009
Ministry of the Interior 0:012 0:011 0:011 0 0 0 0:010 0:010 0:009 0:010 0:010 0:009
Ministry of Industry 0:012 0:011 0:011 0:012 0:012 0:011 0:010 0:010 0:009 0:010 0:010 0:009
Ministry of agri 0:012 0:011 0:011 0 0 0 0:010 0:010 0:009 0 0 0
Other ministries 0:071 0:068 0:068 0:062 0:059 0:058 0:071 0:069 0:069 0:041 0:040 0:039
State prefectures 0:071 0:068 0:068 0:074 0:071 0:070 0:061 0:059 0:059 0:062 0:060 0:059
38
Table 13 Power Values for Artois - Picardie RBC, 1987 - 2007.
1987  1992 1993  1998 1999  2004 2005  2007
qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI
Agriculture 0:044 0:044 0:040 0:045 0:046 0:041 0:055 0:053 0:051 0:053 0:051 0:050
Industry&energy 0:176 0:139 0:178 0:182 0:136 0:182 0:178 0:159 0:186 0:160 0:144 0:165
Urban communities 0:015 0:014 0:013 0:015 0:015 0:013 0:027 0:026 0:025 0:027 0:025 0:024
Rural communities 0:015 0:014 0:013 0:015 0:015 0:013 0:014 0:013 0:012 0:013 0:013 0:012
Coastal communities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other communities 0:044 0:044 0:040 0:045 0:046 0:041 0:068 0:067 0:064 0:067 0:064 0:063
Region 0:044 0:044 0:040 0:045 0:046 0:041 0:041 0:040 0:038 0:040 0:038 0:037
District 0:250 0:289 0:295 0:258 0:296 0:309 0:233 0:262 0:273 0:227 0:265 0:268
Inter-district 0:015 0:014 0:013 0:015 0:015 0:013 0:014 0:013 0:012 0:013 0:013 0:012
Fishery & sh industry 0:044 0:044 0:040 0:045 0:046 0:041 0:027 0:026 0:025 0:040 0:038 0:037
Tourism 0:015 0:014 0:013 0:015 0:015 0:013 0:014 0:013 0:012 0:013 0:013 0:012
Water supply industry 0:015 0:014 0:013 0:030 0:030 0:027 0:014 0:013 0:012 0:013 0:013 0:012
Residential water users 0:029 0:029 0:027 0:030 0:030 0:027 0:014 0:013 0:012 0:027 0:025 0:024
Ecologists 0:029 0:029 0:027 0:030 0:030 0:027 0:041 0:040 0:038 0:040 0:038 0:037
Professional bodies 0:059 0:059 0:055 0:061 0:062 0:056 0:068 0:067 0:064 0:067 0:064 0:063
Ministry of Environment 0:015 0:014 0:013 0:015 0:015 0:013 0:014 0:013 0:012 0:013 0:013 0:012
Ministry of land devt&rural a¤ 0:015 0:014 0:013 0:015 0:015 0:013 0:014 0:013 0:012 0:013 0:013 0:012
Ministry of health 0:015 0:014 0:013 0:015 0:015 0:013 0:014 0:013 0:012 0:013 0:013 0:012
Ministry of the Interior 0:015 0:014 0:013 0 0 0 0:014 0:013 0:012 0:013 0:013 0:012
Ministry of Industry 0:015 0:014 0:013 0:015 0:015 0:013 0:014 0:013 0:012 0:013 0:013 0:012
Ministry of agri 0:015 0:014 0:013 0 0 0 0:014 0:013 0:012 0:013 0:013 0:012
Other ministries 0:088 0:094 0:085 0:076 0:080 0:072 0:096 0:101 0:093 0:093 0:094 0:090
State prefectures 0:029 0:029 0:027 0:030 0:030 0:027 0:014 0:013 0:012 0:027 0:025 0:024
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Table 14 Power Values for Loire - Bretagne RBC, 1987 - 2007.
1987  1992 1993  1998 1999  2004 2005  2007
qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI
Agriculture 0:061 0:057 0:057 0:064 0:060 0:059 0:062 0:059 0:059 0:056 0:052 0:052
Industry&energy 0:149 0:133 0:149 0:155 0:134 0:153 0:140 0:129 0:143 0:143 0:132 0:146
Urban communities 0:018 0:016 0:016 0:018 0:017 0:016 0:016 0:015 0:014 0:032 0:030 0:029
Rural communities 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:007 0:007 0:008 0:007 0:007
Coastal communities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other communities 0:026 0:024 0:023 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:054 0:051 0:051 0:056 0:052 0:052
Region 0:070 0:065 0:065 0:073 0:068 0:067 0:062 0:059 0:059 0:063 0:060 0:060
District 0:246 0:301 0:296 0:255 0:314 0:309 0:217 0:260 0:257 0:222 0:267 0:263
Inter-district 0 0 0 0:018 0:017 0:016 0:023 0:022 0:021 0:016 0:015 0:014
Fishery & sh industry 0:044 0:041 0:040 0:045 0:042 0:041 0:047 0:044 0:043 0:048 0:045 0:044
Tourism 0:018 0:016 0:016 0:018 0:017 0:016 0:023 0:022 0:021 0:024 0:022 0:022
Water supply industry 0:018 0:016 0:016 0:018 0:017 0:016 0:016 0:015 0:014 0:008 0:007 0:007
Residential water users 0:018 0:016 0:016 0:018 0:017 0:016 0:031 0:029 0:028 0:032 0:030 0:029
Ecologists 0:026 0:024 0:023 0:027 0:025 0:024 0:039 0:037 0:036 0:040 0:037 0:037
Professional bodies 0:105 0:100 0:101 0:100 0:095 0:095 0:085 0:082 0:082 0:095 0:092 0:093
Ministry of Environment 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:007 0:007 0:008 0:007 0:007
Ministry of land devt&rural a¤ 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:007 0:007 0:008 0:007 0:007
Ministry of health 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:007 0:007 0:008 0:007 0:007
Ministry of the Interior 0:009 0:008 0:008 0 0 0 0:008 0:007 0:007 0:008 0:007 0:007
Ministry of Industry 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:007 0:007 0:008 0:007 0:007
Ministry of agri 0:009 0:008 0:008 0 0 0 0:008 0:007 0:007 0:008 0:007 0:007
Other ministries 0:053 0:049 0:048 0:045 0:042 0:041 0:054 0:051 0:051 0:040 0:037 0:037
State prefectures 0:088 0:082 0:083 0:091 0:086 0:086 0:078 0:074 0:074 0:071 0:068 0:068
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Table 15 Power Values for Rhin-Meuse RBC, 1987 - 2007.
1987  1992 1993  1998 1999  2004 2005  2007
qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI
Agriculture 0:016 0:016 0:015 0:017 0:017 0:015 0:029 0:028 0:027 0:028 0:028 0:026
Industry&energy 0:180 0:159 0:189 0:190 0:160 0:197 0:174 0:159 0:184 0:169 0:152 0:180
Urban communities 0:033 0:032 0:030 0:017 0:017 0:015 0:029 0:028 0:027 0:042 0:042 0:039
Rural communities 0:016 0:016 0:015 0:017 0:017 0:015 0:014 0:014 0:013 0:014 0:014 0:013
Coastal communities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other communities 0:033 0:032 0:030 0:034 0:034 0:031 0:043 0:043 0:040 0:042 0:042 0:039
Region 0:049 0:049 0:046 0:052 0:052 0:048 0:043 0:043 0:040 0:042 0:042 0:039
District 0:230 0:253 0:268 0:241 0:263 0:282 0:217 0:240 0:252 0:211 0:232 0:245
Inter-district 0 0 0 0:017 0:017 0:015 0:014 0:014 0:013 0:056 0:056 0:053
Fishery & sh industry 0:049 0:049 0:046 0:052 0:052 0:048 0:043 0:043 0:040 0:042 0:042 0:039
Tourism 0:016 0:016 0:015 0:017 0:017 0:015 0:014 0:014 0:013 0:014 0:014 0:013
Water supply industry 0:016 0:016 0:015 0:017 0:017 0:015 0:014 0:014 0:013 0:014 0:014 0:013
Residential water users 0:016 0:016 0:015 0:017 0:017 0:015 0:029 0:028 0:027 0:028 0:028 0:026
Ecologists 0:033 0:032 0:030 0:034 0:034 0:031 0:043 0:043 0:040 0:042 0:042 0:039
Professional bodies 0:082 0:085 0:078 0:086 0:093 0:083 0:072 0:073 0:069 0:070 0:072 0:068
Ministry of Environment 0:016 0:016 0:015 0:017 0:017 0:015 0:014 0:014 0:013 0:014 0:014 0:013
Ministry of land devt&rural a¤ 0:016 0:016 0:015 0:017 0:017 0:015 0:014 0:014 0:013 0:014 0:014 0:013
Ministry of health 0:016 0:016 0:015 0:017 0:017 0:015 0:014 0:014 0:013 0:014 0:014 0:013
Ministry of the Interior 0:016 0:016 0:015 0 0 0 0:014 0:014 0:013 0:014 0:014 0:013
Ministry of Industry 0:016 0:016 0:015 0:017 0:017 0:015 0:014 0:014 0:013 0:014 0:014 0:013
Ministry of agri 0:016 0:016 0:015 0 0 0 0:014 0:014 0:013 0:014 0:014 0:013
Other ministries 0:082 0:085 0:078 0:069 0:071 0:065 0:087 0:091 0:084 0:056 0:056 0:053
State prefectures 0:049 0:049 0:046 0:052 0:052 0:048 0:043 0:043 0:040 0:042 0:042 0:039
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Table 16 Power Values for Rhône - Méditerranée - Corse RBC, 1987 - 2007.
1987  1992 1993  1998 1999  2004 2005  2007
qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI
Agriculture 0:048 0:046 0:044 0:048 0:046 0:043 0:048 0:046 0:045 0:050 0:048 0:046
Industry&energy 0:173 0:131 0:169 0:173 0:131 0:169 0:153 0:135 0:157 0:157 0:146 0:164
Urban communities 0:019 0:018 0:017 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:032 0:031 0:029 0:033 0:032 0:031
Rural communities 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:007 0:008 0:008 0:007
Coastal communities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other communities 0:029 0:028 0:025 0:029 0:028 0:025 0:065 0:062 0:061 0:091 0:091 0:089
Region 0:048 0:046 0:044 0:058 0:056 0:053 0:048 0:046 0:045 0:041 0:040 0:038
District 0:269 0:328 0:329 0:269 0:328 0:329 0:226 0:268 0:268 0:215 0:248 0:251
Inter-district 0 0 0 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:007 0:008 0:008 0:007
Fishery & sh industry 0:048 0:046 0:044 0:048 0:046 0:043 0:048 0:046 0:045 0:050 0:048 0:046
Tourism 0:029 0:028 0:025 0:029 0:028 0:025 0:024 0:023 0:022 0:025 0:024 0:023
Water supply industry 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:029 0:028 0:025 0:024 0:023 0:022 0:025 0:024 0:023
Residential water users 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:032 0:031 0:029 0:033 0:032 0:031
Ecologists 0:029 0:028 0:025 0:029 0:028 0:025 0:040 0:039 0:037 0:041 0:040 0:038
Professional bodies 0:077 0:076 0:071 0:077 0:076 0:071 0:065 0:062 0:061 0:066 0:064 0:063
Ministry of Environment 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:007 0:008 0:008 0:007
Ministry of land devt&rural a¤ 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:007 0:008 0:008 0:007
Ministry of health 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:007 0:008 0:008 0:007
Ministry of the Interior 0:010 0:009 0:008 0 0 0 0:008 0:008 0:007 0:008 0:008 0:007
Ministry of Industry 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:007 0:008 0:008 0:007
Ministry of agri 0:010 0:009 0:008 0 0 0 0:008 0:008 0:007 0:008 0:008 0:007
Other ministries 0:067 0:066 0:062 0:058 0:056 0:053 0:065 0:062 0:061 0:050 0:048 0:046
State prefectures 0:077 0:076 0:071 0:077 0:076 0:071 0:065 0:062 0:061 0:058 0:056 0:054
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Table 17 Power Values for Rhône - Méditerranée - Corse RBC, 1987 - 2007.
1987  1992 1993  1998 1999  2004 2005  2007
qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI
Agriculture 0:039 0:037 0:035 0:040 0:038 0:036 0:042 0:041 0:039 0:037 0:036 0:036
Industry&energy 0:165 0:145 0:168 0:168 0:146 0:170 0:153 0:143 0:159 0:144 0:154 0:156
Urban communities 0:010 0:009 0:009 0:010 0:009 0:009 0:034 0:032 0:031 0:064 0:063 0:063
Rural communities 0:019 0:018 0:017 0:010 0:009 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:016 0:015 0:015
Coastal communities 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:011 0:010 0:010
Other communities 0:029 0:028 0:026 0:030 0:028 0:027 0:059 0:057 0:056 0:112 0:114 0:116
Region 0:068 0:065 0:063 0:069 0:066 0:064 0:059 0:057 0:056 0:037 0:036 0:036
District 0:243 0:288 0:290 0:248 0:293 0:296 0:212 0:245 0:247 0:134 0:140 0:142
Inter-district 0 0 0 0:010 0:009 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:021 0:021 0:020
Fishery & sh industry 0:049 0:046 0:044 0:050 0:047 0:045 0:042 0:041 0:039 0:043 0:041 0:041
Tourism 0:019 0:018 0:017 0:020 0:019 0:018 0:017 0:016 0:016 0:016 0:015 0:015
Water supply industry 0:019 0:018 0:017 0:020 0:019 0:018 0:017 0:016 0:016 0:016 0:015 0:015
Residential water users 0:019 0:018 0:017 0:020 0:019 0:018 0:034 0:032 0:031 0:032 0:031 0:030
Ecologists 0:029 0:028 0:026 0:030 0:028 0:027 0:051 0:049 0:048 0:048 0:047 0:046
Professional bodies 0:097 0:097 0:093 0:099 0:099 0:095 0:085 0:083 0:082 0:059 0:057 0:057
Ministry of Environment 0:010 0:009 0:009 0:010 0:009 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:037 0:036 0:036
Ministry of land devt&rural a¤ 0:010 0:009 0:009 0:010 0:009 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:005 0:005 0:005
Ministry of health 0:010 0:009 0:009 0:010 0:009 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:011 0:010 0:010
Ministry of the Interior 0:010 0:009 0:009 0:010 0:009 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:011 0:010 0:010
Ministry of Industry 0:010 0:009 0:009 0:010 0:009 0:009 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:011 0:010 0:010
Ministry of agri 0:010 0:009 0:009 0 0 0 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:011 0:010 0:010
Other ministries 0:058 0:056 0:054 0:050 0:047 0:045 0:059 0:057 0:056 0:080 0:079 0:080
State prefectures 0:078 0:075 0:073 0:079 0:076 0:074 0:068 0:066 0:065 0:043 0:041 0:041
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8.3 Adour-Garonne river basin, 1989-2006
Table 18 Population Shares for Industrial, Agricultural and Residential Water
Users in Adour - Garonne River Basin, 1989 - 2006.
rst scenario second scenario
industry agriculture residential industry agriculture residential
1989 0:176 0:106 0:717 0:088 0:053 0:859
1990 0:175 0:103 0:722 0:088 0:051 0:861
1991 0:171 0:099 0:729 0:086 0:050 0:865
1992 0:167 0:097 0:736 0:083 0:049 0:868
1993 0:162 0:094 0:745 0:081 0:047 0:872
1994 0:158 0:090 0:751 0:079 0:045 0:876
1995 0:158 0:087 0:756 0:079 0:043 0:878
1996 0:156 0:085 0:759 0:078 0:043 0:879
1997 0:152 0:084 0:765 0:076 0:042 0:882
1998 0:150 0:080 0:770 0:075 0:040 0:885
1999 0:148 0:076 0:776 0:074 0:038 0:888
2000 0:150 0:073 0:777 0:075 0:036 0:889
2001 0:149 0:070 0:781 0:075 0:035 0:890
2002 0:145 0:068 0:786 0:073 0:034 0:893
2003 0:142 0:067 0:791 0:071 0:034 0:895
2004 0:139 0:067 0:794 0:070 0:033 0:897
2005 0:135 0:063 0:802 0:068 0:031 0:901
2006 0:132 0:059 0:808 0:066 0:030 0:904
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8.4 Power Values for block model (11 groups)
Table 19 Power Values for Adour - Garonne RBC (11 groups), 1987 - 2007.
1987  1992 1993  1998 1999  2004 2005  2007
qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI qi=n Bz SSI
Agriculture 0:083 0:074 0:074 0:074 0:066 0:065 0:092 0:089 0:086 0:082 0:078 0:076
Industry 0:143 0:135 0:138 0:148 0:139 0:144 0:122 0:107 0:103 0:134 0:138 0:131
Urban communities 0:012 0:009 0:008 0:012 0:008 0:007 0:020 0:018 0:015 0:021 0:021 0:020
Rural communities 0:012 0:009 0:008 0:012 0:008 0:007 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:010 0:011 0:012
Environmental ass. 0:167 0:147 0:156 0:160 0:141 0:150 0:184 0:173 0:188 0:196 0:176 0:187
Other communities 0:048 0:048 0:044 0:049 0:054 0:051 0:082 0:078 0:076 0:082 0:078 0:076
Region and District 0:286 0:356 0:353 0:296 0:373 0:369 0:255 0:297 0:302 0:278 0:323 0:323
Ministry of Industry 0:012 0:009 0:008 0:012 0:008 0:007 0:010 0:009 0:008 0:010 0:011 0:012
Professional bodies 0:095 0:082 0:081 0:099 0:079 0:077 0:092 0:089 0:086 0:082 0:078 0:076
Other ministries 0:071 0:065 0:065 0:062 0:058 0:059 0:071 0:070 0:069 0:041 0:031 0:033
State prefectures 0:071 0:065 0:065 0:074 0:066 0:065 0:061 0:062 0:059 0:062 0:055 0:055
8.5 Nucleolus
The nucleolus is a solution concept for cooperative games, which was rst formulated by
Shmeidler (1969). In order to formulate it, let us rst introduce for any set of winning
coalitions W a characteristic function V :
V (S) =
8<: 1 if S 2 W0 otherwise :
Hereafter we will consider the game in the form (N; V ).
For convenience, for some vector x we dene by
x(S) 
X
i2S
xi for any S  N:
A payo¤ vector x = (x1; :::; xn) with xi  v(i) and x(N) = v(N) is called an imputation.
We denote by X(N; V ) the set of all imputations of the game (N; V ).
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Let x be an imputation, then for any coalition S the excess of S is dened as
e(S; x) = V (S)  x(S):
One may interpret this number as a measure of dissatisfaction for coalition S at im-
putation x. For any imputation x let S1; :::; S2n 1 be an ordering of the coalitions for which
e (Sl; x)  e (Sl+1; x) for l = 1; :::; 2n   2. Let E(x) be the vector of excess dened as
El(x) = e (Sl; x) for all l = 1; :::; 2n  1. We say that E(x) is lexicographically less than E(y)
if
El(x) < El(y) for the smallest l for which El(x) 6= El(y):
We denote this relation by E(x) lexmin E(y).
Denition 1 The nucleolus is the set of imputations x for which the vector E(x) is lexico-
graphically minimal:
 = (N; V ) = fx 2 X(N; V ) : @y 2 X(N; V ) : E(y) lexmin E(x)g :
The following recursive procedure is used to characterize the nucleolus. By denition
E1 (x) is the largest excess of any coalition relative to x. At the rst step of the procedure
we nd the set X1 of all imputations x that minimizes E1 (x):
min 
s.t. e(S; x)   for all S; ;  S  N
and x(N) = V (N)
:
The set X1 is called the least core of c. If it is not a unique point, we nd the set X2
of all x in X1 that minimizes E2 (x), the second largest excess and so on. This process
eventually leads to an Xk consisting of a single imputation, called the nucleolus (Shmei-
dler (1969), Machler, Peleg and Shapley (1979)). The nucleolus minimizes recursively the
dissatisfactionof the worst treated coalitions.
It appears that the nucleolus of a game in coalitional form exists and it is unique. If the
core is not empty, the nucleolus is in the core. Like the Shapley value the nucleolus can be
obtained as the unique value satisfying a set of axioms.
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